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Abstract 
As the European Union grapples with the sovereign debt crisis, other actors are observing its 
search for solutions. China, one of the EU’s most important strategic partners, is watching 
developments in the eurozone and the EU with great interest.  
This essay gives an overview of China’s perceptions of the EU and the protection of Chinese 
investments in Europe since the outbreak of the European sovereign debt crisis, especially 
since the more concrete talks in late 2011 on possible financial support from China.  
Although the top leadership of the communist party of China (CPC) changed in its recent – 
once-in-a-decade – handover, the perceptions described in this paper are likely to remain the 
same, just as the main tenets of China’s foreign policy are unlikely to change in the near 
future. 
The essay argues that while the EU’s image has suffered greatly from the sovereign debt 
crisis and the way it has been handled, there is room to improve China’s view of Europe and 
for the EU to maintain a relatively strong negotiation position towards China. 
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Introduction  
When Mark Leonard wrote his acclaimed book “What does China think?”1 in an attempt to 
explain Chinese political debates to his readers, the West acknowledged that very little is 
known about the policy discussions being conducted in contemporary China. The question 
of how the European sovereign debt crisis influences China’s perception of the EU, for 
example, is of great relevance in the current crisis-ridden environment. The EU and China, 
both strong actors on the global scene, have enjoyed a flourishing partnership in recent 
decades.2 There have nevertheless been several issues that have detracted from the harmony 
of the relationship. Issues that have been seen by China as problematic in the past are the 
criticism exercised by the EU of China’s human rights record,3 the perceived non-recognition 
of China’s impressive development up to now,4 the EU arms embargo towards China5 and 
the refusal of the EU to accord China the status of market economy,6 as well as the feeling 
that the EU wants to ‘westernise China’.7 
At the same time, China has increasingly recognised the EU as a global power, even if only a 
limited one, and as a possible model for its own development. In the eyes of leading Chinese 
academics the EU’s power is based on its economic strength and on the strength of the euro.8 
The European Union is the top export destination for Chinese goods. China is the EU’s 
second trading partner and there is a mutual interest in deepening the EU-China trade 
relationship. Yet, high-level discussions aimed at concluding a comprehensive Partnership 
                                                   
1 M. Leonard (2008), What does China think?, London: Fourth Estate. 
2 M. Stumbaum (2009), The European Union and China, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, p. 64. 
3 N. Casarini (2006), “The evolution of the EU-China relationship: from constructive engagement to strategic 
partnership”, Occasional Paper No. 64, Institute for Security Studies, Paris, p. 31. 
4 J. Men (2011), “The Chinese Perceptions of the EU, but whose Perceptions?”, EU-China Observer, Issue 6, p. 
9. And: interviews with Chinese citizens (numerous and from different social and educational 
backgrounds), Beijing, February-August 2008. 
5  Zhongguowang (2012), “China erwartet Ende des Waffenembargos und Anerkennung als 
Marktwirtschaft”, Zhongguowang (China.org) (http://german.china.org.cn/international/2012-07/13/ 
content_25903317.htm). 
6 C. Ding (2009), “The Influence of the Financial Crisis on China-Europe Relations”, EU-China Observer, 
Issue 5, p. 8. 
7  L. Zhu (2008), “Chinese perceptions of the EU and the China-European relationship”, in David 
Shambaugh, Eberhard Sandschneider and Zhou Hong (eds), China-Europe Relations: perceptions, policies and 
prospects, New York: Routledge, p. 157. 
8 Z. Feng (2006)‚ “Issues Related to the EU’s Foreign Policy”, Contemporary International Relations, Vol. 16, 
No. 4, p.26, cited in David Shambaugh (2008), “China eyes Europe in the world”, in David Shambaugh, 
Eberhard Sandschneider and Zhou Hong (eds), China-Europe Relations: perceptions, policies and prospects, 
New York: Routledge, p. 131. 
And: Zhu, op. cit., p. 149. 
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and Cooperation Agreement have dragged on for more than five years and still reveal a 
hiatus in positions on many important chapters, such as the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, inconsistencies in regulatory practices and the maintenance of non-tariff 
barriers. 
Finally, and not unimportantly, one third of China’s foreign exchange reserves are held in 
euro. Several questions arise from this in the light of the current situation of the EU and 
especially the eurozone: is the EU perceived as losing its power and attractiveness? How 
exactly does China see the EU now that the euro is severely weakened and its economy is 
suffering as a result? How should Europe feel about these perceptions and about the 
increasing number of Chinese investments on its territory? And, importantly, how should 
the EU relate to China and assess its leadership change?  
China’s perceptions of Europe  
In order to examine the changing perceptions of the EU that have developed in China in the 
course of the European sovereign debt crisis, a clarification of what we mean by ‘China’ is 
necessary. The essay aims to gauge the views of China in both elite circles and the ‘normal’ 
population. This is difficult, however, because elites are not always open and accessible and 
the population cannot always express its opinion openly, if it has one, of the EU. 
To gain insight into elite perceptions of the EU in crisis government sources, scholarly 
sources and media sources are used. These are treated as being of equal value as they all 
somewhat reflect the official Chinese government stance due to direct and indirect 
government censorship, which affects the public media, think tanks and governmental 
university research centres alike.9 Furthermore, public opinion as expressed by ‘netizens’ 
(cybercitizens, or people actively involved in the online community) is taken into 
consideration where useful because the internet has become the platform for the expression 
of Chinese public opinion. The economic and financial crisis has triggered an outpouring of 
public opinion on the internet, as did the Olympic Games in 2008.10 While some western 
observers argue that netizen opinions are influenced by the Chinese government and the 
state-controlled media11 and the Chinese internet is arguably not as free as it is in the west,12 
it is nevertheless important to take note of the opinions of the Chinese people because 
“public opinion has become an important factor in shaping the government’s policy-
making”.13  
As far as China’s possible involvement in the EU’s crisis is concerned, the Chinese 
government would not want to lose its ‘output legitimacy’ (justified by end results) by 
spending the nation’s reserves in the wrong way. Experts on EU-China relations support this 
view by stating that “Beijing is also worried that any contribution to a European bailout will 
run into opposition from an increasingly well-informed and critical populace.”14 
                                                   
9 Men, op. cit., pp. 7-9. 
10 Men, Ibid. 
11 Y. Sun (2011), “Chinese Public Opinion: Shaping China’s Foreign Policy, or Shaped by It?”, Brookings 
Institution, (http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/12/13-china-public-opinion-sun).  
12  K. Altmeyer (2012), “Bürgerrechte in China im digitalen Zeitalter – Analysen und Kommentare”, 
Heinrich Böll Stiftung, (http://www.boell.de/downloads/2012-07-buergerrechte_china_digitales_zeitalter. 
pdf, p. 1). 
13  C. Zhang (2011), “Media, Public Opinion, and China’s Foreign Policy”, Carnegie Endowment 
(http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/01/08/media-public-opinion-and-china-s-foreign-policy/6ocj). 
14 S. Islam (2011), “Europe and China: Rivals or Strategic Partners? Policy briefing”, understandingchina.eu 
(http://www.understandingchina.eu/chinaideascommunity/latestresearchonChina/tabid/887/Default.as
px?PostID=2717&CurrentPage=0&filter=4, p. 3). 
WHEN THE RISING DRAGON SEES FADING STARS | 3 
 
Because the crisis is ongoing and still a topic of debate, academic literature on it is scarcer 
than retrievable accounts of Chinese perceptions of Europe before the crisis. Also, this 
literature is rarely translated into English and difficult to obtain without access to Chinese 
university online libraries. However, the topic is quite openly discussed in the Chinese 
media. In some cases European or other non-Chinese sources are used if they cite Chinese 
stakeholders; due to the current intense interest in China they have recently interviewed 
Chinese government officials or experts in economics.  
This paper follows China-expert Geeraerts’ approach to understanding China’s perception of 
the EU by tracing it back to China’s own dual identity, which paradoxically consists of what 
he calls both “self-superiority and self-inferiority”,15 based on its long history as a powerful 
empire and its more ‘recent’ and wounding experiences with western nations, such as the 
Opium Wars and, partly, colonisation.16 
How have China’s perceptions of Europe changed? 
A number of observations on the European sovereign debt crisis made by the Chinese elite 
challenge perceptions held before the crisis. New perceptions range from i) worries about 
growing disunity within the EU to ii) questioning Europe’s status as a possible pole in an 
emerging multipolar world to iii) the perception that Europe can no longer serve as a model 
for Chinese development; that it has to change its stance towards China, take note of Chinese 
calls to reform the European welfare and political systems and accept conditions imposed by 
China. Furthermore, iv) Europe’s value as an investment opportunity is examined by the 
Chinese elite and v) Chinese public opinion reflects the above-mentioned elite perceptions 
while adding domestic concerns and entrenched nationalistic views to the discussion. Finally, 
some Chinese observers also perceive vi) a strong sense of Sino-European interdependence. 
Concerns over growing disunity within the EU 
One of the current observations is the widely held perception of disunity in the EU’s 
handling of the crisis. The former Head of the Chinese Delegation to the EU, Ding Yuanhong 
(丁原洪) notes that in the course of the crisis leaders in the EU blamed each other for making 
mistakes instead of trying to search for solutions together responsibly. He also observes that 
Germany and France have increasing problems with domestic issues and consequently the 
Franco-German driving force of European integration is more focused on how integration 
should continue to be realised. Ding furthermore takes note of demands in some EU member 
states to re-establish national currencies and break up the eurozone.17  
Tang Shuangning (唐双宁), CEO of the China Everbright Bank and former high official at the 
banking regulation commission of China, compares the global financial crisis to the 
European one and observes that the joint efforts deployed by the international community to 
resolve the 2008-financial crisis stand in sharp contrast to the many differing opinions about 
how to resolve the European sovereign debt crisis.18 
                                                   
15 G. Geeraerts (2007), “In the Eyes of the Dragon; Chinese Perceptions of the EU as a Global Actor”, Brussels 
Institute of Contemporary China Studies Asia Papers, Vol. 1, No. 4, p. 6. 
16 Geeraerts, op. cit. 
17丁原洪, ‘深陷困境的 欧盟’, 和平与发展， 2010, 58书页. [Ding Yuanhong (2010), “The European Union in 
Dilemma”, Peace and Development Journal, No. 4, p. 58.] 
18唐双宁, ‘从金融危机到欧债危机: 我们怎么办?’, 宏观经济，2011 年，15 书页. [Tang Shuangning (2011), 
“From Financial Crisis to European Sovereign Debt Crisis: What shall we do?”, Economic Affairs Journal, p. 
15.] 
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Some Chinese stakeholders appeal to the EU to work more closely together to overcome this 
disunity. They even go so far as to ask some member states to hand over more sovereignty.19 
A request that might seem odd, given China’s firm views on sovereignty and non-
interference with the internal affairs of other countries.  
The disunity of the EU is also seen as an obstacle to meeting China’s conditions to help bail 
out EU countries and, ultimately, to receiving any help at all. As Journalist in Chief of the 
liberal Southern Weekly Cao Xin (曹辛) remarks, there is little chance the EU will agree to the 
conditions that China has tabled because doing so would require unanimity among the EU 
member states; a requirement that Cao sees as unlikely to be met.20 
 A globally weakened EU 
Some Chinese scholars also establish a clear link between the EU’s in-fighting and its 
importance in international affairs in general. For example, scholar Shi Chenxia (石晨霞) 
emphasises that the current discord within the EU over how to solve the crisis also means 
that the EU speaks with less of a single voice in global affairs and prevents it from playing an 
important role in the global arena.21 In Chinese eyes, the EU is thus perceived as less able to 
assume the mantle of global power.  
 Since the 1980s, Europe was seen to be one of the poles in an emerging multipolar world22 
and, more importantly, as a counterbalance to the two Cold War superpowers. It was even a 
widely held belief among China’s elite that the EU and China shared common views on how 
the international system should be restructured and that both of them actually aimed at a 
mutlipolarisation of the world system.23 
The quality of the EU as an actual pole was already being questioned in the mid-2000s, 
however, and important scholars such as Feng Zhongping (冯中平), Director of the Institute 
of European Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations 
considered that the EU was seen as a pole mainly because of its economic power and the 
strong euro. But from the mid-2000s on the EU was coming to be seen as more of an 
“incomplete or unbalanced pole”.24 This analysis hints at the importance of the current 
eurozone crisis in shaping Chinese perceptions of the EU. 
Shi Chenxia states that before the crisis the euro was a worthy competitor against the US 
dollar, but, in order to maintain their position as a monetary hegemon, the US has dealt more 
efficiently with its crisis than the eurozone has managed to do so; it is doubtful whether the 
eurozone is strong enough to meet the current challenges.25 Shi argues that, even though 
there are various pessimistic views among Chinese academics on the impact of the crisis on 
the euro, all observers acknowledge that the euro has suffered and that it will face great 
                                                   
19  M. Uken (2011), “Chinesische Investmentbankerin:“ Schaffen Sie eine Fiskalunion! ”, Zeit Online 
( http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2011-11/china-euro-italien , p. 2). 
20 曹 辛 , 我 们 怎 么 能 不 帮 你 ， 倒 霉  的 欧 罗 巴 —G20 峰 会 前 瞻 ,  南 方 周 末 , 2011 年 , 
http://www.infzm.com/content/64477. [Cao Xin (2011), “How can we not help you? Fortuneless Europe - 
looking towards the G20 summit”, Southern Weekly online ( http://www.infzm.com/content/64477). 
21石晨霞, ’论金融危机对欧洲一体化及欧盟国际地位的影响’, 湖北行政学院学报, 2期 2011 年第, 95 书页. [Shi 
Chenxia (2011), “Discussing the impact of the financial crisis on European integration and on the 
international position of the EU”, Journal of Hubei Administrative Studies Institute, Issue 2, p. 95]. 
22 Stumbaum, op. cit., p. 75. 
23 Zhu, op. cit., pp. 154-156. 
24 Feng‚ op. cit. 
25 Shi, op. cit., p. 92. 
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pressures for some time to come. According to Shi, some observers also see the crisis as the 
possible end of the euro.26  
In a similar vein, the former Head of the Chinese Delegation to the EU, Ding Yuanhong, 
states that the woeful state of the euro will not only destroy market-confidence in the single 
currency but the worldwide reputation of the euro will be harmed as well.27  
In sum, the importance that the Chinese attribute to the euro as an element justifying the 
pole-status of Europe and the perception that the euro’s global image will decline have 
considerable consequences for the ‘pole-quality’ of the EU and for its image as a 
counterweight to the hegemonic USA. 
‘European model’ discredited  
Before the crisis it was thought that Europe could be a good partner to foster China’s 
‘opening up’ and development by bringing about Foreign Direct Investment and high-
technology transfers.28 Some Chinese scholars even coined the term “European model”29 
because they thought China could learn from Europe in different fields such as politics, 
economics, social system(s) and cultural issues. 30  However, a perception that has now 
surfaced and that seems to have found resonance is that due to the crisis the ‘European 
model’ itself has become discredited. At the centre of Chinese criticism one can find 
democracy as well as the European welfare system(s). 
Tang Shuangning, China Everbright Bank CEO and former high official at the banking 
regulation commission of China, sees the European sovereign debt crisis as the result of two 
paradoxical phenomena: first, government spending that exceeds a country’s own financial 
power to finance expensive systems of welfare and what he calls “radical democratisation”.31 
Second is the fact of having a monetary union without a common fiscal policy.32 
Ding Yuanhong also sees Europe’s social welfare systems as being ultimately untenable. He 
argues that the crisis shows that the EU cannot afford social welfare systems that rely too 
heavily on borrowing to finance them. He gives two underlying reasons for this: first, social 
welfare systems have made European products more expensive and thus uncompetitive, and 
second, the efficiency of production is not optimised because some countries have kept 
employees in jobs that are not needed, for reasons of social concern.33 He concludes that the 
EU has to adapt to changes in the world, such as new competitors, and that social systems 
will have to be reformed.34  
The current Chairman of the Sovereign Wealth Fund of China and former Deputy Minister 
of Finance of China Jin Liqun (金立群) even states that “the labour laws [in the EU member 
                                                   
26 Ibid. 
27 Y. Ding, op. cit., p. 57. 
28 Casarini, op. cit., p. 33. 
29 Zhu, op. cit. 
30 Ibid., p. 151. 
31 Tang, op. cit., p. 15. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Y. Ding, op. cit., p. 57. 
34 Ibid., p. 58. 
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states] induce sloth and indolence, rather than hard work.”35 For Jin, unless the social welfare 
system of the EU is reformed, investment in the EU would appear to be a bad choice.36 
Yi Xianrong (易宪容), economist at the Institute of Finance and Banking at the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences sees the reasons for the crisis as residing in the slow processes of 
discussion brought about by the democratic system of the EU.  
Conditionality 
A new form of conditionality has emerged alongside the idea of China bailing out the EU. 
The conditions that can be found are multiple, but some can be taken more seriously than 
others as they have been set out by China’s highest governmental leaders. 
For example, China’s former Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) claimed that the EU should 
recognise China as a market economy in exchange for help.37 Other concessions mentioned 
by the Chinese on one or the other occasion are: ”Less heat over human rights;(…); greater 
access to Chinese companies for trade and investment purposes; and greater voting rights at 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF)”,38  as well as less criticism of China’s monetary 
policy.39 
Market Economy Status (MES) is seen from different angles by different Chinese scholars. 
Yang Yao points to the symbolic value of the recognition of China’s achievements over the 
past 30 years that would go hand in hand with China being granted MES.40 
Not granting MES to China is perceived as a protectionist move by the EU because anti-
dumping cases under WTO law would be more difficult to file against China if it had MES.41 
42 The fact that the EU does not grant MES to China, despite the latter’s support in the 
eurozone crisis, is interpreted in China “as proof of its [the EU’s] unease and distrust at 
China’s growing economic power”.43 
Conditions demanding less criticism of human rights – as well as less criticism of China’s 
monetary policy – hint at a perception of growing political self-importance due to the EU’s 
sovereign debt crisis and China’s helping role in it. China has never been keen on taking 
criticism for its domestic behaviour; but the linking of China’s help to an explicit demand for 
less criticism is a new element in the changed relationship. 
Some scholars put things less starkly but generally adopt this view. For example the Director 
of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, Pei Minxin (裴敏欣), states that if 
China helps the EU “the EU must set aside some of its long-standing suspicions about 
China.”44  This shows that China is increasingly insisting on its own norms and their validity.  
                                                   
35L. Jin (2011), cited in Aljazeera “Jin Liqun: Europe induces ‘sloth, indolence’”, Aljazeera.net 
( http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2011/11/2011114434664695.html). 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 A. Lobov (2011), “Opinion: Why China shouldn’t bail out Europe”, Asiamoney, Vol. 22, Issue 9, p. 2. 
39 Spiegel Online), “China diktiert Bedingungen für Finanzhilfe”,  Spiegel Online, 
28.10.2011,(http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/0,1518,794503,00.html) . 
40 Yang, op. cit. 
41  M. Pei (2011), “Can China Rescue Europe?”, Project Syndicate (http://www.project-syndicate.org/ 
commentary/can-china-rescue-europe-). 
42 Cao, op. cit. 
43 Islam, op. cit., p. 3. 
44 Pei, op. cit. 
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This growing assertiveness and criticism is defended by some Chinese scholars. For example, 
the Director of the China Center for Economic Research at the Beijing University Yang Yao 
(姚洋) states: “(…) having long been a student of the West, China has equal reason to ask 
why the teacher has gone so wrong.”45 He furthermore explains that, apart from pursuing 
materialistic interests through conditionality and criticism, “(t)he Chinese also want 
respect”.46 
Such statements do not only point to a perceived power shift but also hint at China’s dual 
identity, as explained by Geeraerts, and at the fact that for China itself the “self-superiority” 
end of the identity spectrum is gaining ground. 
Interestingly, so far the new leadership duo of Li Keqiang (李克强) and Xi Jinping (习近平) 
has demonstrated that Europe and its crisis are important concerns for them, while 
commenting on the crisis in a rather cautious and sometimes even positive manner and 
without voicing direct conditionality. 
For example, when asked for his opinion on the European sovereign debt crisis, Xi Jinping 
stated that 
“… the EU has a high degree of political consensus on overcoming difficulties and 
crisis and preserving and advancing the outcomes of European integration. China 
does not think one should ‘talk down’ or ‘short’ Europe, because China believes that 
the difficulties facing Europe are temporary, and the EU and the governments and 
people across Europe have the ability, the wisdom and the means to solve the 
sovereign debt problem and achieve economic recovery and growth.”47  
Li Keqiang diplomatically stated: “We hope to see a more open and cooperative Europe,”48 
and: “We hope to see a more inclusive and accommodating Europe.”49 In this context he also 
expressed the desire that Europe start to accept China’s own way of thinking and developing: 
“If China and Europe can both achieve success by development models suited to 
their respective conditions, we will make the world more harmonious and 
prosperous.”50  
Such remarks are astonishingly positive and accommodating compared to the conditions 
described above. The reason for this might be that the new Chinese leadership wants to start 
its term with as few problems as possible by establishing a spirit of good Sino-European 
cooperation. It might also have been a tactic to ensure that no diplomatic blunders hinder the 
new power transition. In that case, Europe may just have to wait until Li and Xi have made 
sure that they have strong enough positions within their new government to develop their 
own standpoints towards Europe and stop making low-profile remarks only. This is very 
likely, because, as observers point out: “…compared with the Hu-Wen team, the next cohort 
is likely to be more confident as China has now acquired more importance in the 
                                                   
45Y. Yang (2011), “Europe on a Chinese Shoestring”, Project Syndicate (http://www.project-syndicate.org/ 
commentary/europe-on-a-chinese-shoestring). 
46 Ibid. 
47 J. Xi (2012), cited in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (FMPRC), “Vice 
President Xi Jinping gives written interviews to the Irish times”, FMPRC (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ 
zxxx/t910350.htm). 
48 K. Li (2012), “China has high hopes for European ties”, Financial Times (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ 
f6911db2-92aa-11e1-b6e2-00144feab49a.html#axzz2BH9urnpy). 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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international arena.”51 Overall, it can be expected that Xi and Li will keep insisting on the 
issues that were already important under the Hu-Wen leadership: abolishing the EU arms 
embargo, MES recognition and acceptance of China’s own way of doing things, including its 
own interpretations of values such as state sovereignty and human rights.52 
Investment opportunities? 
Besides perceiving the EU as a target for (political) conditionality, some in China simply 
perceive the EU’s weakened economy and the situation of financial austerity as a good 
opportunity to make strategic investments. 
For example, liberal journalist Cao Xin sees the production industry in Germany and France 
and small and medium enterprises in Italy as worthy investment opportunities for China.53 
Similarly, Chen Daofu (陈道富), Editor of China’s Economic Daily, takes the view that China 
should strategically maximise its profits by waiting for the total investment risks to become 
apparent and then use these risks as bargaining chips to ultimately obtain access to 
investments concerning technology and important resources.54 Pei Minxin also perceives the 
crisis as an opportunity for the Chinese to “find rich pickings”,55  and Lu Feng (卢锋), 
Professor and Vice Dean at the National School of Development at Beijing University 
observes that investments that are now being made possible, for example in Greece’s Piraeus 
port, would have been politically unthinkable some years ago.56 As Europe grows weaker it 
can no longer hold up all its old barriers; Chinese investors, on the other hand, can bargain 
harder and maximise their profit.  
Another perception of a possibly strategic profit maximisation is that helping out the EU in 
the crisis should be conducted via the IMF in order to add weight to the agreement. 
Chen Daofu believes that China should push the IMF to increase its investments in the 
eurozone and that it should negotiate a more influential place for itself within the IMF in this 
context.57 
In contrast, Shi Chenxia is critical of the EU’s heavy reliance on the IMF to bail out Greece. 
Shi sees this as undermining the credibility and trustworthiness of the eurozone, as it has 
asked “third-world countries, which are not even able to cope with their own problems”58 for 
help.59  
However, possible investments – especially in government bonds or the European rescue 
mechanisms – are also seen as problematic by some observers: one concern lies in the 
perception that the EU has not done enough to guarantee the security of future investments 
                                                   
51 Z. Wang and A. Vangeli (2012), “China’s leadership succession: new faces and new rules of the game”, 
European Union Institute for Security Studies (http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/ 
chinas-leadership-succession-new-faces-and-new-rules-of-the-game/). 
52 Ibid. 
53 Cao, op. cit. 
54 陈 道富, ‘欧债危机继续发酵 中国 需审慎定位救助 角色‘, Journal of Finance and Economy, 2011 年, 第 10 期, 
21 书页. [Chen Daofu (2011), “As the European Debt Crisis continues to grow, China has to carefully 
consider its position in a salvation role”, Journal of Finance and Economy, Issue 10, p. 21.] 
55 Pei, op. cit. 
56 F. Lu (2010), cited in A. Becker, “Europe’s crisis is China’s opportunity”, Asia Times Online 
(http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/LG02Cb01.html). 
57 Chen, op. cit. 
58 Shi, op. cit.  
59 Ibid. 
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in the EFSF and top Chinese economists, such as Liu Olin (刘奥琳) or Li Daokui (李稻葵) 
perceive the EU as not giving enough security guarantees for investors to help strengthen the 
new European security facilities.60   The EFSF simply does not seem to deliver a good 
opportunity to realise economic interests through an investment, as for example, Liu Olin 
explains by stating that: “The extent to which deposits from investors are secured is crucial. 
Is it 20% or 100%? That makes an enormous difference. Otherwise, in the end nobody will be 
willing to invest."61 
Public opinion – elite perceptions and domestic concerns 
Adding to the elite discussion on China’s position in the European crisis, the comments 
published below are taken from some public media articles by Chinese netizens and voice a 
high degree of discontent with the idea that China should help the eurozone to cope with its 
crisis.62 63 
The reasons for this discontent are numerous; some are explicitly directed towards Europe, 
others are more concerned with domestic problems. 
One frequently raised argument is that China should invest its money domestically instead 
of giving it to European countries where the population is considered to be much better off 
than in China anyway. Criticism of China’s own regime can also be read between the lines in 
comments that lament the fact that Chinese citizens have no way of influencing their 
country’s reserves policy; and that the money should be invested in urgent domestic reforms 
to tackle problems of corruption, healthcare, education and housing systems. Others would 
like to see tax cuts and investments in the reform of state monopolies. 64  Other net 
commentators do not want to see China finance Europe because of lingering historical 
resentments. They state that the EU has always acted purely in its own interests and that 
China should now do the same.65  
                                                   
60 M. Uken, op. cit., pp. 1-2. 
And: Spiegel Online (2011), “China diktiert Bedingungen für Finanzhilfe”, Spiegel Online 
( http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/0,1518,794503,00.html). 
61 Liu Olin,  cited in: Uken, op. cit., p. 2 (translated by author from German to English). 
62 Such postings by netizens are mostly carried out under pseudonyms and not traceable to any author. 
Therefore, this section summarises the main arguments and indicates as their source the website of the 
article beneath which the postings can be found. It has to be noted that the arguments presented can be 
found quite frequently but that no guarantee of their complete representativeness can be given as only a 
choice of relevant website-articles has been analysed, due to time constraints. 
63 L. Alderman and D. Barboza (2011), “Europe Tries to Lure Chinese Cash to Back Rescue of Euro”, The 
New York Times online reprints (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/29/world/asia/europe-seeks-chinese-
investment-in-euro-rescue.html?pagewanted=all). 
64 (1) Various netizens’ comments, commenting on: 曹辛, 我们怎么能不帮你，倒霉 的欧罗巴—G20峰会前瞻,  
南方周末, 2011 年 (http://www.infzm.com/content/64477. [Cao Xin (2011), “How can we not help you? 
Fortuneless Europe – looking towards the G20 summit”, Southern Weekly online ( http://www.infzm.com/ 
content/64477). 
And: 郑 宋 鲁 , 中 国 应 该 如 何 援 助 欧 洲 ?, 联 合 早 报 网 , 2011 年 , retrieved 27-04-2012, 
http://www.zaobao.com/forum/pages4/forum_lx111111d.shtml . [Zheng Songlu (2011), “How should 
China help Europe?”, Zaobao.com ( http://www.zaobao.com/forum/pages4/forum_lx111111d.shtml).] 
And: (2) Various netizens’ comments, commenting on: 曹辛, 我们干嘛还要和欧盟玩 ,  南方周末, 2011 年,  
retrieved 28.02.2012，http://www.infzm.com/content/64858 . [Cao Xin (2011), “Whatever we do, we still 
have to play with the EU”, Southern Weekly online (http://www.infzm.com/content/64858). 
65 (1) Various netizens’ comments, op. cit.  
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The view that China should use this opportunity strategically is also widely represented. 
Help given to the EU should not engender a loss or little revenue for China, but if good 
investment opportunities turn up, some netizens argue, they should be seized. Others go 
further and support the idea of obtaining MES or the lifting of the arms embargo towards 
China.66 Some netizens also express the fear that the investments could be lost if China gets 
dragged into Europe’s crisis. Pragmatically, some commentators argue that a private 
household would never invest in a bankrupt company so China should not invest in 
bankrupt countries.67 
Sino-European interdependence 
Despite the reservations expressed above, what is also recognised in China is a strong Sino-
European interdependence. 
Cao Xin refers to an element of Chinese dependence on Europe. He states that one third of 
China’s foreign exchange reserves are held in euro and that the EU is China’s biggest foreign 
trade partner; two facts that make it difficult for China not to care about the European 
sovereign debt crisis.68 This argument states that instead of seeing relations between China 
and the EU as a power balance, Cao foresees a joint decline should the EU’s situation worsen. 
Chen Xin (陈新), Director of the economics department of the Institute of European Studies 
in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, also holds the view that instead of a power shift 
between China and the EU one should speak about a growing interdependence of the two.69 
But while Chen also acknowledges this interdependence, he highlights the fact that in the 
past China was more dependent on the EU whereas nowadays, even without the crisis, 
China is becoming more important for the EU as an export market.70 
Should Europe fear China? 
The above-mentioned shifts in perceptions, relations and resulting actions have triggered 
certain fears of a ‘scramble for Europe’ 71  with China pursuing a strategy of ‘reverse 
colonialism’, 72  buying up strategic assets in Europe and establishing greater political 
presence there through its help during the European sovereign debt crisis. Even if China 
does feel more confident of its power and sees the European model as being fairly 
discredited, panic about a ‘Chinese invasion’ is not warranted.  
First of all, the European fear of a colonialising China might be more a case of looking at 
China through European eyes. From a European perspective, it is almost natural to suppose 
that a rising China would have colonialist ambitions, as in its own phase of development 
Europe used its power to colonialise other countries, among which, ironically, was China. 
It can be argued however, that the Chinese are in fact far more pragmatic than what is often 
supposed. China’s direct investments in Europe can be seen as a new way for them to 
                                                   
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Cao, op. cit. 
69 Interview with Dr. Chen Xin (陈新), Bruges, 20.03.2012. 
70 Ibid. 
71 F. Godement, J. Parello-Plesner and A. Richard (2011), “The Scramble for Europe”, European Council on 
Foreign Relations, No. 27, p. 1. 
72  V. Ni (2011), “Concerns Grow over China’s Presence in Europe”, understandingchina.eu 
(http://www.understandingchina.eu/Chinaideascommunity/KnowledgePartnercontributions/tabid/887
/PostID/2687/Default.aspx). 
WHEN THE RISING DRAGON SEES FADING STARS | 11 
 
stabilise their growth. In order to sustain growth it is necessary to move from a basic 
production industry to a high-tech industry, and in order to obtain knowledge and gain 
access to successful brand names, the Chinese tend to invest in assets that can deliver these 
to them.73 Direct investment in Europe can “also allow Beijing to advance the interests of 
Chinese companies as they go global”.74  
One reason for the Chinese to invest in European bonds is that they want to diversify their 
foreign exchange reserves. The greatest share of these reserves is held in US dollars so an 
increase of the share of euro would help China to diversify its reserves, thus creating a less 
one-sided risk.75 Risk-aversion also explains the growing interest of the Chinese to not only 
buy government bonds but to carry out direct investment in foreign countries.76 
As stated above, the Chinese interpreted the adoption of the euro as the EU taking on the 
status of the pole in the multipolar world they envisaged. If they help Europe out in its 
current crisis this can be seen as China pursuing its aim of keeping Europe as a pole in a 
multipolar world and of strengthening the euro’s role against the US dollar as current lead 
currency. A strong Euro(pe) would thus further their goal of shifting the current power 
balance on the international stage. 
Some observers argue that China’s primary goal is to sustain its own development and that, 
in order to do this it needs “continuity, stability and harmony”.77 The statement of current 
EU Counsellor to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hua Chunying, concerning 
Europe and its crisis is telling in this context: “Europe, for a long period in history used to be 
the pillar and source of stability and we hope it will continue to be so.”78  
Professor for social sciences at the Europa Zentrum Roland Benedikter and Stanford 
University professor for security issues Jae-Seung Lee point out that the European crisis 
comes at a bad time for China, which, for its own development, needs smooth economic 
developments at the global level. According to the two authors, China is not so much 
seeking to increase its political clout but rather to gain time for its own development.79 
When considering some of the political conditions that have been raised in the Chinese 
discussion on the European sovereign debt crisis, rather than wanting to impose its own 
interpretation of human rights, China seeks the acknowledgement of the West that it can 
legitimately pursue its own (Chinese) way of development without having to take on 
European values it does not share. Benedikter and Lee describe China’s political and cultural 
psyche as “non-aggressive”80 and “reposing in itself”.81 China’s aim is thus not to impose its 
own ideas and values but to gain acceptance for the values according to which it proceeds 
                                                   
73 M. Rimmele (2012), “Chinas Weltmarken von morgen (3)‚ Sany- made in Germany‘”, tagesschau.de 
(http://tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/chinaserie106.html). 
74 L. Alderman (2010), “Looking for Investments, China Turns to Europe”, The New York Times online reprints 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/02/business/global/02euro.html). 
75 Ni, op. cit. 
76 A. Wheatley (2011), “China investment wave unlikely to swamp the EU”, Reuters 
(http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/12/28/uk-china-investment-idUKLNE7BR01120111228). 
77  R. Benedikter and J.-S. Lee (2012), “China fürchtet die Selbstaufgabe des Westens”, Welt Online 
(http://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article13829594/China-fuerchtet-die-Selbstaufgabe-des-
Westens.html).  
78C. Hua (2011), cited in V. Pop, “Chinese official: Eurozone collapse would be a ‘disaster’”, EU observer 
(http://euobserver.com/884/114437). 
79 Benedikter and Lee, op. cit. 
80 Ibid.  
81 Ibid.  
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itself, on its own territory. If one looks at the conditions that China sets in return for financial 
support it is clear that they mostly revolve around acceptance and recognition. This stands in 
clear contrast to the types of conditionality that other powers exercise, where the aim is to 
literally impose their own values on other countries. In a way, China only wants to achieve 
having nothing imposed on it by Europe. 
Therefore, even if China perceives Europe as weakened and criticises the political flaws in 
the EU system, its primary interest is not to become a neo-colonial power on the European 
continent. Such arguments have to be taken into consideration when examining the Chinese 
perception of the EU as they put the debate going on in China, and in Europe, back into 
perspective. 
What now?  Some recommendations 
On 15 November 2012, China underwent an important leadership transition with the fifth 
generation of top civil servants being sworn in. Whereas the most important figures in the 
communist party of China (CPC) have changed, existing perceptions are likely to remain the 
same as China’s state-interest-centred foreign policy will not undergo dramatic changes in 
the near future. The name of the game will continue to be peaceful development, 
diversification of reserves held in foreign currencies and rebalancing trilateral relations with 
the US and the EU. Moreover, think tanks and university research institutes will continue to 
influence the EU policy of the new generation of Chinese leaders. As the former perceive 
China in a relatively strengthened position vis-à-vis the EU, this might be reflected in the EU 
policy of the new generation. 
It is therefore important for the EU to know how it can most effectively deal with the new 
Chinese leadership. An important issue to keep in mind is that domestic stability is one of 
the prime aims of the CPC because the party can derive legitimacy from it. Before the 18th 
party congress, scandals and power deals have disturbed the image of a calm and organised 
power changeover,82 which has led to a relatively unstable domestic situation. This has two 
main consequences for the EU: on the one hand, in times of relative instability all ‘foreign 
problems’ are welcome distractions of domestic public attention away from internal 
problems. An example of this is the current dispute with Japan revolving around the 
Senkaku (in Chinese: Diaoyu) islands in the East China Sea and the recent anti-Japan 
demonstrations in several Chinese cities,83 which certainly do not come at an inopportune 
time for the CPC. If in this phase the EU would seem too critical of the new regime, the EU’s 
crisis might be a welcome distraction to discredit the EU in the eyes of the Chinese public. A 
first recommendation for the EU would thus be to carefully observe the ongoing power 
transition but to refrain from excessive comment and premature criticism.  
On the other hand, next to a smooth power transition another prerequisite for stability is 
further economic growth.84 The EU is the biggest importer of Chinese goods, so China’s 
export-led growth depends on strong purchasing power in the EU. The eurozone crisis thus 
does not come at a good time for China’s already unstable transition phase and slow-down 
in growth rates. European leaders could thus use this dependence of China on a prospering 
EU to attract more willingness to help from their Chinese counterparts. This seems to be 
happening already, in part, with Chinese former Premier Wen Jiabao announcing further 
                                                   
82 Guy de Jonquières (2012), “China’s Challenges”, ECIPE Policy Brief No. 01/2012, p. 4. 
83 Spiegel Online (2012), “Chinesische Militärschiffe provozieren Japan”, Spiegel Online 
(http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/senkaku-inseln-china-schickt-schiffe-in-japanische-gewaesser-a-
855738.html). 
84 A. Mertha (2012), “Domestic Institutional Challenges Facing China’s Leadership on the Eve of the 18th 
Party Congress”, Asia Policy, No. 14, p. 5. 
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help at the recent China-EU business summit and stepping up IMF contributions at the Los 
Cabos G20 meeting.85 European leaders should try to engage the new generation of Chinese 
leaders as soon as possible in behind-the-scenes talks on how China can help solve the 
European sovereign debt crisis and the Chinese interest in this should be accentuated here. 
Furthermore, as China moves away from a leadership of one single powerful person (or two 
in duo leadership) towards a “more collective form of leadership” 86  it will become 
increasingly important for the EU to know who the new persons in charge are in the 
Standing Committee of the Politburo (PSC). There has been a division of labour in the PSC 
since 200787 and each of the possible candidates for positions in the PSC has their own field 
of expertise. The EU therefore has to be familiar with the profiles of the new PSC members to 
know whom to address on which matter. Simply focusing on the new general secretary of 
the party, the president or the premier will be an increasingly unsatisfactory tactic in the 
future.  
Additionally, the new generation of PSC members will consist of adherents of two different 
factions. On the one hand, there is the ‘elitist coalition’;88 members of which have veteran 
communist family backgrounds and come from within the party establishment and, on the 
other hand, there is the ‘populist coalition’89 whose members come from geographical areas 
and families that are less privileged.90  These factions compete for power and the social 
groups in Chinese society that they represent. Whereas the elitists focus on the interests of 
entrepreneurship in the country, the populists are more concerned with poorer groups such 
as farmers and urban citizens, or ‘non-citizens’ such as illegal migrant-workers. It is known 
that the top leaders Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang come from different factions, Xi being elitist 
and Li from the populist faction.91  The EU has to know which PSC member is in which 
faction and will thus be more or less likely to cooperate on certain policy fields. Just as 
opposition forces can pressurise democratic governments in certain directions, a single-party 
system should be easier to influence and deal with if there are several factions within it. 
A third recommendation concerns the Chinese position in multilateral organisations. 
Economically, they are already one of the most important countries in the world. Yet, they 
hold disproportionately little voting power in the IMF and regret that the leadership of the 
IMF and the World Bank seem to be decided in a repeat game between the USA and 
Europe.92 If the Chinese, like other emerging countries, try to improve their position in the 
IMF by helping Europe via the IMF, this should be welcomed by the more established 
western nations even if the Chinese gain more rights in the institution as a result. If western 
nations constantly try to keep other countries and systems in lower positions than they 
would merit, the result will be frustration with the inflexibility of the post-World War II 
bodies. The aim to establish a common BRICS Development Bank pronounced at the BRICS 
                                                   
85D. Vincenti (2012), “EU, China leaders agree to disagree”, Euractiv (http://www.euractiv.com/global-
europe/eu-china-leader-agree-disagree-news-514940?utm_source=EurActiv%20Newsletter& 
utm_campaign=f5ee2d2da8-newsletter_weekly_update&utm_medium=email). 
86 C. Li (2012), “Leadership Transition in the CPC: Promising Progress and Potential Problems”, China: An 
International Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 30. 
87 C. Li (2012), “The Battle for China’s Top Nine Leadership Posts”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1, 
p. 131. 
88 Li, op.cit., pp. 136-137. 
89 Ibid.  
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid., p. 137. 
92  C. Kenny (2012), “IMF to the U.S. and Europe: Help Not Wanted”, Bloomberg Businessweek 
(http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-06-14/imf-to-the-u-dot-s-dot-and-europe-help-not-wanted). 
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New Delhi summit this year93 is an early sign of such frustration and could result in the 
establishment of independent institutions for the non-western world – in which the USA and 
Europe would have no say at all. For this reason, the EU should work with China and not 
against it, and support it vis-à-vis its own reluctant member states and the USA when 
striving for an enhanced position. Of course, to do this, space for the emerging countries 
would have to be created within the IMF. As has been suggested, the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) could serve “as the legal instrument to merge [eurozone] member state 
quotas in the IMF into a single euro-area quota”.94 By doing so, eurozone countries would be 
represented in the IMF together and places that are now held by individual eurozone 
countries could be given to emerging countries.95 
Fourthly, with its new exclusive competence in the negotiation of foreign investment treaties, 
the EU should focus its attention on negotiating a treaty that grants European companies 
more market access than is currently the case. Although Beijing’s leadership transition might 
slow this process down, to start it now might help speed the process up once the new leaders 
are installed. On both the Chinese and the EU side, high-level support exists for “launching 
negotiations of an EU-China Investment Agreement as soon as possible”.96 While DG Trade 
is at present working on the negotiating directive necessary to obtain the mandate and is also 
informed that similar processes are taking place on the Chinese side,97 the fact that this is one 
of the first agreements of this kind negotiated at EU level, and that it could replace the 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) that 26 EU member states have concluded with China, 
creates the risk that it could take some time before a mandate is given to the European 
Commission. It would be best to accelerate this process on the European side, in order to be 
prepared for the start of the negotiations and to appear as strong and united as possible. 
China will not cede more access to European companies easily, but with its economy 
depending more and more on the returns on foreign direct investment, the EU has strong 
counter-arguments to negotiate a favourable deal. The EU should try not to weaken its 
position by allowing too much in-fighting about technical details of the new EU-wide foreign 
investment treaties. 
Finally, as stated above, before the crisis China did attribute a ‘model’ role to the EU for its 
own development. Although the crisis has discredited the European model in its political 
and social policy aspects, the EU should use the openness with which the term was 
originally coined by Chinese scholars and become (or remain) a model, at least in some areas. 
Whereas the financing of social systems and European integration without further political 
integration are perceived in China as no longer working, Europe still has a lot to offer and 
these aspects should be highlighted when speaking with China. While it is necessary to 
address the crisis, the EU should not forget that there are many fields in which the Chinese 
might still be keen to learn lessons.  
                                                   
93 S. Rao (2012), “BRICS: future aid superpowers?”, Reuters 
( http://blogs.reuters.com/globalinvesting/tag/brics/). 
94 D. Gros (2012), “The Case for IMF Quota Reform”, Council on Foreign Relations 
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95 Ibid. 
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One area where the EU has valuable experience to offer is that of consumer protection 
standardisation. China might have an interest in learning from Europe here, as recurring 
food scandals put party legitimacy in question.98 
Another area where China is still eager to learn from the EU is ecological and sustainable 
urbanisation. Here, cooperation is already successful as the recently signed China-EU 
Urbanisation Partnership Joint Declaration reveals.99 There are signs that China wants to go 
further in this field, for example by fostering housing energy-efficiency standards, a process 
for which China is dependent on European eco-efficiency technologies.100  
Apart from these two fields, more generally, China is also seeking to boost its innovation 
base and develop its economy into one that does not only imitate high technology from the 
West but one that invents such products itself.101 Here, China could find it interesting to look 
into the education and research systems established in member states of the EU that are 
capable of developing creative and innovative researchers and knowledge-based industries.  
A final point of orientation that Europe could offer China concerns peaceful integration and 
cooperation with neighbouring countries. In the territorial disputes China currently finds 
itself embroiled in with its neighbours, the EU could serve as a reminder that peaceful 
cooperation can lead to greater prosperity than (military) confrontation. 
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